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1. Introduction

1. The recent report by the Pew Center on the StatesÕ (2008) Public Safety Performance Project puts the incarceration rate at 1 out of every 100 adults. The rate is 1 out of
130 Americans of all ages.
2. The prison population in 1995 is a function of criminological, economic, political, and demographic conditions in 1995, 1994, 1993, and so on into the past. The models
done so far, however, essentially regress, say, unemployment in 1995 on the stock of
prisoners in 1995, and it is thus unclear what the coefficient really means.
3. Note that all but Listokin (2003) suffer from substantial identification problems
(Pfaff, 2008).
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The scope of incarceration in the United States is hard to underestimate.
Approximately 1.6 million people are currently in prison, an incarceration
rate of 700 per 100,000, or nearly 1 out of every 130 Americans (and about
one out of every twenty black men).1 The United States possesses only 5% of
the worldÕs population, but it houses one-third of its prisoners (Walmsley,
2007), and cash-strapped states are spending nearly $40 billion per year to
incarcerate them. This is a new development: The U.S. incarceration rate was
a steady 100 per 100,000 people for nearly fifty years, from 1920 (when the
statistics were first gathered) through 1970, at which time there were only
300,000 people in prison. The subsequent quintupling of prison populations
is an event previously unseen here or abroad.
Yet equally remarkable is how little we actually understand about
causes of this buildup. Researchers have posited a wide array of insightful
theories, and in some cases they have mustered anecdotal or historical
evidence in corroboration. But there is scant rigorous empirical evidence,
and what work has been done has primarily taken the total stock of prisoners as the dependent variable. As I argue in Pfaff (2008), this stock variable is shaped by a host of concurrent and lagged factors that cannot be
easily modeled,2 and it is ultimately unclear if these efforts have produced
any well-identified estimates.
The flow variables of admissions and releases are substantially more conducive to empirical analysis. A few empirical studies have looked at admissions (see Marvell, 1995; Jacobs and Helms, 1996; Marvell and Moody,
1997, 1996; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Listokin, 2003; Nicholson-Crotty,
2004; Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, 2005),3 but none has rigorously examined
releases. This article starts to fill this gap, as part of a broader empirical
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4. Thus, if 10,000 people were admitted in 1990 and the total prison population was
100,000, this formula returns an average sentence length of ten years. This would be an
accurate estimate were the prison population in equilibrium, but during transition periods
it is biased.
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project examining trends in American prison populations over the past
thirty years. Despite the claims and anecdotes—in media and academic
writings alike—about the severity of contemporary sentencing policy, we
have at best only a weak understanding of what patterns in time served
actually look like. This article provides a rich descriptive account of time
served in prison, demonstrates that prison growth has been driven primarily by changes in admission policy rather than release policy, and examines how inmate characteristics such as race, ethnicity, sex, age, and
conviction offense influence time served.
To date, investigators have made only rough examinations of release
policy, looking at releases through crude approximations of time served,
such as dividing the number of prisoners admitted in a given year by that
yearÕs total prison population (see, e.g., Blumstein and Beck, 1999).4 Taking advantage of the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP),
a highly detailed—and underused—data set, I can map (to the day)
how the time served by individual inmates changes over a ten- to
twenty-year period in a sample of eleven states. As a result, I am able
to paint a much more detailed and nuanced picture of the time spent in
prison and its effect on overall prison growth.
The results stand in stark contrast to conventional wisdom, which
often argues that prison growth has been driven by increasingly punitive,
‘‘tough-on-crime’’ legislatures passing harsher and harsher sentencing
laws—such as mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing (TIS) laws,
two- and three-strike laws, and parole abolitions—even as crime rates
entered their long decline in the 1990s. Media accounts of sentencing
focus heavily on shockingly long sentences for relatively minor crimes.
Academics have similarly emphasized longer sentences: Blumstein
and Beck (1999), for example, argue that 57.7% of the growth in prison
population between 1980 and 1996 was due to longer sentences.
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5. Because of limitations in the data, I cannot compare the relative importance of
admissions to that of time served prior to the late 1980s (no state in my sample provides
reliable data prior to 1987, and in two cases not before 1992). Figure 1b, however, suggests that increasing time served may have played a more important role in prison growth
around the late 1980s.
6. This is an approximation—180 days comes from the 2002 NCRP data, while
the parole data come from the 2006 BJS survey of parole practices (Glaze and Bonczar,
2007).
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The results from the NCRP tell a much different story. In many states, the
median time served has declined over much of the 1990s; so too has the 75th
percentile of time served, and even the 90th percentile in some cases. As I
demonstrate below, it is undoubtedly clear that the United States has become
more punitive over the past thirty years, but rarely with respect to sentence
length actually served. It is our willingness to incarcerate in the first place,
not to keep people in prison once admitted, that appears to have been the
fundamental engine of prison growth since the late 1980s and early
1990s.5
It is important, however, not to overstate this point. First, the rise in
admissions has been driven at least in part by the incarceration of increasingly minor offenders, who likely serve shorter sentences; after all, prison
populations grew during the longest recorded crime drop in American history. Comparing time served by those admitted in 1988 to time served by
those admitted in 1998 is thus challenging since the two groups are not
identical—a greater fraction of those admitted in 1998 would be serving
short(er) sentences even if sentencing policy had grown more severe. Controlling for this shift in the distribution of offenders yields less dramatic
results, but ones that still suggest time served has frequently remained relatively constant or even declined.
Second, other countervailing trends may mask the effect of increasingly
punitive practices. Some states, for example, parole prisoners quickly but
violate them back aggressively—the median prisoner in California serves
only 180 days, but California violates nearly 30% of its parolees back
to prison in any given year (accounting for 43% of all parolees violated
back in the United States).6 If a large number of inmates returns to prison at
least once, is the median time 180 or 360 days? Also, capacity may limit time
served, so were admission rates to decline, total population may decline
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7. Though employment status or, say, education could affect time served as well,
the five traits listed here are the only five consistently reported in the NCRP. Particularly
disappointing is the NCRPÕs failure to provide data on prior convictions: Though officially included in the data, the entry is blank for every inmate in every state in every
year.
8. To be clear, I use ‘‘sentencing’’ to refer to choices about how long to incarcerate
someone already heading to prison, not the decision whether to incarcerate in the first place;
that falls under ‘‘admissions.’’ The line, however, is not always clear—admission can be
thought of as raising time served from zero to something greater than zero.
9. While the number of drug offenders in prison, and their share of the total prison
population, has risen over the years, their importance peaked at 20% of the nationÕs total
population. The incarceration of low-level violent and property offenders thus appears to be
much more important.
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more slowly—with more capacity available, states may force prisoners to
serve longer fractions of their (longer) sentences.
And third, aggregate state-level quantiles may mask important differences in
time served across various types of prisoners. To explore this issue more carefully, I develop offender-level survival models to examine the effects of race,
ethnicity, sex, age, and (broadly defined) offense type on time actually served.7
My aggregate results appear to overstate time served by nonviolent and by elderly inmates, and they understate time served by the young and by the Hispanic. No other trait—including race—appears to significantly influence time
served.
The results in this article shed new, and important, light on U.S. penal
policy. First, they indicate that our attention to sentencing8 matters is at
least partially misplaced. While institutions such as the Families Against
Mandatory Minimums and the Justice Kennedy Commission (2004) challenge sentencing regimes such as mandatory minimums, most of the
growth in prison population has come through admissions, an area that
receives substantially less attention; and the one facet of admissions that
receives perhaps the most attention—the incarceration of low-level drug
offenders—is not as important as that attention suggests.9 Tough-on-crime
activists likewise focus on passing increasingly draconian sentences that
appear to have little effect on actual outcomes. Reformers on both sides are
looking in the wrong place.
Second, these results suggest that, despite its great size, the U.S. prison
population need not be particularly stable. Rising admissions drive the current growth in prisons, and admission rates—unlike release rates—can
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2. Prison Release Trends in the United States
Our understanding of sentence lengths and release policy is driven more
by anecdote and crude empiricism than by extensive examinations of the
data. In general, precise release behavior is not readily observable in much

10. Changes in sentencing policy generally operate with a lag. Reducing the sentence
for burglary from ten years to six years will have no effect for six years (ignoring parole),
while changing the admissions rate for burglary reduces the prison population instantly.
11. Consider the following example. A state admits 100 prisoners per year: 25 serve
three-year terms, 25 serve one-year terms, and 50 serve six-month sentences. The median
time served is six months, and the 75th percentile one year, as in California. In equilibrium, the prison population at any given point is 125. If the state imposed a one-year ban
on admissions, total population would immediately drop to 50, a 60% decline (despite
75% of all prisoners being released within one year). The longer the right tail, the smaller
the effect of the one-year freeze: If the 25 long timers served four years, the one-year freeze
would result in a 43% drop from 175 to 100; if they served ten years, a 25% drop from 300
to 225. (Conversely, if they served two years, the drop would be the full 75%.) I examine
this issue more fully in Pfaff (2010), and I find that such long-serving inmates do not
impose too strong a barrier to real reform.
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change immediately.10 Again, though, it is important not to overstate this
point. A small cadre of very long-serving inmates could exert a disproportionate effect on both the size and the rate of change of the prison population.
As a result, a one-year admissions freeze in, say, California, where the 75th
percentile time to release is one year, need not result in the prison population
falling by 75%.11
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed look at
time served by inmates in those states providing sufficient data to the
NCRP. Section 3 then develops two counterfactuals that demonstrate
more sharply the substantially larger role changes in admissions, as compared with changes in releases, have played in driving overall prison
population sizes. Section 4 addresses the relative importance of changes
in parole violation policies. And Section 5 constructs a more rigorous
empirical model to estimate the extent to which the general results given
in Section 2 vary across different types of inmates. The Appendix discusses the data and the technical aspects of the empirical models in more
detail.
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12. These data are on state prisoners held in state-run prisons. Thus, a federal inmate
housed in a state prison does not appear here (nor does a federal prisoner in a federal
prison), nor do any convicted inmates serving time in local jails.
13. Looking beyond the 90th percentile would be informative, but it is hard to do: In
all but one state in my sample, for example, the 99th percentile prisoner from any entering
cohort has yet to be released. That life sentences and death sentences alone comprise 3%
of all violent sentences, and that violent offenders make up 50% of all inmates, suggests
that a core of offenders serves very long sentences. Pfaff (2010) examines this issue in
more detail.
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of the data available on the correctional system. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reports the number of inmates released each year in every state,
but these aggregate values provide no information on the time served by
those released, and time-served estimates such as Blumstein and BeckÕs
(1999) rest on troubling assumptions. To overcome this problem, this article
uses data gathered by the NCRP to develop substantially more precise measures of time served. The NCRP is an offender-level data set, in which participating states submit data on each offender as he enters and leaves
prison.12 As a result, I can calculate to the day the exact time served by each
inmate released from prison, and I can count the number of offenders admitted in a particular year who are still serving time in a future year. The
NCRP also provides demographic, offense, and sentencing information on
each inmate. As I explain in the Appendix, the NCRP is not without its limitations, but it provides the clearest picture of releases available at the
national level.
The NCRP began gathering data in 1983 and continues to this day; this
article uses data through 2002, the most current release available when it was
started. I use data from the eleven states that consistently reported data for
sufficiently long periods of time during the sample period: California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey,
South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. Together, they contain 30%
of the total prison population in United States.
This section presents the trends in median, and 75th and 90th percentile
times to release.13 It also examines the challenge changing admissions policies
pose for interpreting these trends. Subsequent sections use the NCRP to (1)
develop two counterfactuals to demonstrate more clearly the generally minor
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Figure 1. (a) Prison population 1925–2004. (b)
Admissions and release 1977–2004. (c) Prison population
and crime 1977–2004.
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14. For any year, the gap between the two lines in Figure 1b equals the amount by
which the line in Figure 1a rises.
15. As will soon become apparent, my results differ from those by Blumstein and
Beck (1999), who allocate nearly 60% of the prison growth since the 1970s to longer
sentences. That I focus primarily on the late 1980s and the 1990s—solely due to limitations in the NCRP—may explain our disagreement since their 60% is not disaggregated by
period (although the 1980s and the 1990s appear to be distinctly different phases). Another
partial explanation may be the underrepresentation of the South in my sample due to poor
reporting to the NCRP by Southern states (which, if true, points to a limitation of drawing
inferences from aggregate national-level data).
16. Some sentencing reforms may have been adopted for purely symbolic reasons.
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Joanna Shepherd, ‘‘Sentencing Guidelines,
TIS Legislation, and Bargaining Power’’(working paper, 2006), for example, point out that
numerous states adopted TIS laws after abolishing or restricting parole. Such TIS laws
thus appear to be at least somewhat redundant or symbolic.
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effect of changes in time served on prison population sizes, (2) consider the
possible importance of parole and probation violations, and (3) explore the
importance of inmate-specific traits on time served.
Even before turning to detailed release data, it is easy to demonstrate that the
conventional wisdom about increasing sentencing severity faces some challenges. Figure 1a provides the startling, but well-known, image of prison growth
in the United States, with the placid flatness of the 1920s to the 1970s giving
way suddenly to the steady and unrelenting growth of the past thirty years.
It is somewhat disappointing that Figure 1b does not have the same fame.
This figure decomposes the surging part of Figure 1a into its two primary pieces:
admissions and releases.14 Increasingly severe sentencing practices should manifest themselves in a widening gap between admissions and releases. The story
told in Figure 1b is mixed. The growing gap during the late 1980s is consistent
with increased sentencing severity. But Figure 1b also suggests that sentencing
has not become additionally punitive since then, and if anything has becomes
somewhat less harsh.15 This is surprising. Zimring (2001), for example, defines
the 1980s as a ‘‘lock-Ôem-up’’ period, in contrast to the ‘‘throw-away-the-key’’
approach of the 1990s. And many seemingly tough sentencing reforms—such
as three-strike laws and TIS laws—were widely adopted in the 1990s. But despite these legislative reforms, actual sentencing outcomes appear to have
remained relatively stable, at least for the last ten or fifteen years.16 Thus, even
before delving into the more detailed NCRP data, we should not expect to see
a profound shift in recent sentencing outcomes—although as I explain more
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fully below, the trends in Figure 1c complicate this story somewhat: During the 1990s, prison populations rose while crime rates fell, suggesting
that the severity of the average and marginal prisoner declined during this
period.
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Figure 2. Days to release: (a) median and 75th and 95th percentiles; (b) 10th and
25th percentiles.
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But while Figure 1b is provocative, we can attack this issue more rigorously. Figure 2a provides times to release (in days) of the median,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile prisoners; Figure 2b completes
the distribution by plotting these times for the 10th and 25th percentile
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Figure 2. Continued.
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17. I focus on quantiles here since the mean time served by an entering cohort cannot be calculated until all its prisoners have been released. Moreover, quantiles are less
influenced by outliers, and time served has a long, thin right tail. In Pfaff (2010), I turn my
attention to averages and the role of these long-serving inmates.
18. Although using BJS data, my results are often lower than those reported in BJS
reports that use the NCRP. I believe the difference arises from different frames of reference. The BJS computes the mean time served by those released in a given year (regardless
of the year admitted), while I focus on the time served by those admitted in a given year
(regardless of the year released). That I restrict my focus solely to states that provide complete data may also explain some of the difference (if the missing observations in other
states are not randomly distributed).
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prisoners.17 Focusing for now on Figure 2a, two features stand out. First,
the typical inmate does not spend a significant amount of time behind
bars.18 Median times to release are on the order of about one to two years,
whether in relatively moderate states such as Minnesota or punitive ones
like Michigan. In the big states, such as California and Illinois, the median time to release is well under a year, reaching lows of 179 days in
California and 168 days in Illinois.
Seventy-fifth percentile times to release are often on the order of four to
five years, though in some cases they are substantially lower—around two
years in Minnesota and Illinois, and about one year in California. In most
states in the sample, the seventy-fifth percentile time to release has
remained relatively constant, although Virginia and New Jersey have seen
it rise; Virginia is one of the few states in the sample to see its median time
to release grow as well. These results are robust to breaking down trends
by major crime categories (violent crimes, property crimes, and drug
offenses) and even by offense subcategories.
At one level, these figures undermine the conventional wisdom about
punitive penal policy on the release side. Despite the plethora of toughon-crime sentencing laws passed in the 1980s and 1990s, time actually
served—the metric that really matters—has not changed much in recent
years. And the time that is served does not appear to be particularly long
for the typical inmate.
However, two seemingly contradictory patterns in the 1990s complicate
matters. As Figure 1c makes clear, while prison population rose with rising
crime rates from the late 1970s through the end of the 1980s, the constantly
rising prison populations of the 1990s occurred during a time of steadily
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19. A simple thought experiment makes this clear. A state locks up one serious
offender for ten years each year, so the median time served is ten years. Later, the state
continues to incarcerate the one serious offender, but it raises his sentence to twenty
years, and it starts to incarcerate two minor offenders every year for one-year terms
each. The median sentence length will fall to one year, despite the fact that the total
equilibrium prison population rises from 10 to 22, with 83% (10/12) of that growth due
to the longer sentences for the serious offenders—and with all offenders facing increased sentences (since the minor offenders also see their sentences rise, from zero
years to one year).
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declining crime rates. If more people are going to prison as fewer people
commit crimes, increasingly marginal offenders must be entering our prisons
at increasing rates. Thus, even if states aggressively applied tougher sentencing laws, the median could fall.19 Controlling for this selection effect yields
less dramatic results, but it does not qualitatively undermine the claim that
release policy has not grown noticeably more severe over the past ten to
fifteen years.
Figure 2b sheds light on this issue. If increasingly marginal offenders
are driving prison growth (and thus masking longer stints being served by
more serious inmates), the 10th and 25th percentiles of time served should
decline over the sample period. Such a pattern exists, to some degree, only
in New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington. A slightly more complex
way to address the issue entails looking at trends in three factors. The
marginal offender hypothesis is more likely to be correct if we observe
(1) a rising share of short-term offenders (e.g., those serving less than
one year), (2) declining time served by those short-termers, and (3) rising
trends in time served by those serving longer sentences (more than one
year). Though not reported here, these trends reinforce Figure 2bÕs claims
about New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington. But they also suggest
that the marginal offender effect may be particularly strong in California,
and that it is present, to a much lesser degree, in Illinois (which appears to
be locking up more low-level offenders but not imposing longer sentences
on more serious criminals) and Michigan. The marginal offender effect
appears to be absent in Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, or
Virginia, but then these states do not exhibit much of a decline in time
served in Figure 2a.
Though only a rough means of addressing the marginal offender effect,
these results imply that to the extent time served appears to decline (as
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3. Two Counterfactual Experiments
The above results indicate that time served has remained relatively low and
stable, but they do not clearly illuminate the weak relationship between time
served and prison population growth. To better measure how admissions and
release policies have shaped prison populations, I develop two counterfactuals
in this section. Moving beyond simple quantiles, I calculate the percent of
prisoners admitted in one year that is released in each future year, and I track
how these year-by-year distributions move over time. With these numbers, I
derive two informative comparisons. First, I compare the actual net increase in
prisoners in each state from the first year of available data to 2002 to the hypothetical net increase that would have occurred had the state released prisoners at the same rate every year as it did in the first year. Call this the ‘‘fixed
release rates’’ counterfactual. Second, I compare the actual net increase to
the hypothetical net increase that would have occurred had the state admitted the same number of prisoners in each subsequent year as it did in
the first year. Call this the ‘‘fixed admissions’’ counterfactual.21

20. In other words, effect (1) is stronger than effect (2).
21. In an earlier version of this article, I computed several other counterfactuals,
such as fixing only the distribution of offenses, fixing the distribution of offenses and
release rates, and fixing the distribution of offenses, the release rates, and the size of
the admissions class. These additional counterfactuals do not provide much additional
insight beyond that captured in the two I present here.
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opposed to stagnate), some of the decline is ephemeral. What appears to be
a decrease in time served is partially the result of (1) locking up more and
more minor offenders—who previously would not have been incarcerated at
all—for very short periods and (2) locking up more severe offenders for longer. Even so, few states exhibit strong upward swings in the time served by
long-serving inmates, suggesting that the increased willingness to incarcerate minor offenders has not been matched by an increased willingness to lock
up more serious offenders longer.20 Despite the attention paid to three-strike
laws, TIS laws, and the like, the predominant locus of increased punitiveness
over the past ten to fifteen years still appears to be at the low end, not the
high.
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popt1 ¼

Xt1
t¼t0

ð1 

Xt1 t0
t¼t0

pt ðsÞÞ admitt :

ð1Þ

Here, pt ðsÞ is the fraction of prisoners22 admitted in year t released s years
after admission. The quantity is summed over all the years between the t0, the
first year for which data are available for that state, and the observation
year t1. pop thus measures the net increase in prison population between t0
and t1. The fixed release rates counterfactual sets pt ðsÞ ¼ pt0 ðsÞ for all t
(not s), and the fixed admissions counterfactual freezes admitt at admitt0
for all t.
A concrete example can make this clearer. Assume that of all the prisoners
admitted in year t, 50% are released that year, 30% in year t þ 1, 10% in year
t þ 2, and 10% in year t þ 3 (so no prisoner serves more than three years).
Then, for each admission year t, pt(0) ¼ 0.5, pt(1) ¼ 0.3, pt(2) ¼ 0.1, pt(3) ¼
0.1, and pt(s) ¼ 0 for all s  4. Table 1 provides a hypothetical example in
this state over five years. The value of 200 in the first row of data for 1991
indicates that by the end of that year, only 200 of the 1,000 prisoners admitted in 1990 remain in prison (since 500 are released in 1990 and 300 in
1991). The total of 950 for that year implies that by the end of 1991, prison
admissions since 1990 have added a net 950 inmates to the system. In other
words, 950 ¼ (1 – 0.5 – 0.2) (1,000) þ (1 – 0.5) (1,500). This is Equation (1).

22. I allow the fraction to vary across five broad crime categories (violent, property,
drug, miscellaneous, and unknown) and sum across categories to generate a single total
population number.
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The values in these counterfactuals require some explanation. My goal is
to understand what prison populations would have looked like had the rates
of releases or the number of admissions not changed over the sample period.
To do this, I first calculate how many extra prisoners each entering cohort
contributes to each subsequent year: How many prisoners admitted in 1988
are still in prison at the end of 1988, of 1989, of 1990, and so on. I then
recalculate these numbers in one of two ways—by assuming that the distribution of release rates is constant across cohorts or that the entering size is
constant across cohorts.
In other words, any given point on the ‘‘actual data’’ curve is equal to:
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Table 1. Hypothetical Releases
Remaining Prisoners
Admits

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total

1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000

500

200
750

100
300
1,000

0
150
400
1,250

500

950

1,400

1,800

0
0
200
500
1,500
2,200

Note what Table 1 does not tell us. The ‘‘Total’’ row for 1991 does not
give the actual prison population in 1991, nor does it give the change in the
actual prison population since the start of time series (here, 1990). Instead, it
indicates how admissions and releases since 1990 have changed the prison
population. The prison population in 1991 is surely larger than 950 since
some prisoners admitted in 1989 are still serving time that year. And part
of the real change between 1990 and 1991 is due to prisoners from 1989 and
1988 being released. The ‘‘Total’’ row picks up neither of these forces.
In effect, the ‘‘Total’’ row assumes that the prison population equals zero
when the data start and calculates what the prison population would be in
subsequent years. This is done solely as a concession to limitations in the
NCRP data,23 but it nonetheless yields informative numbers. This is particularly true in later years, where—given the relatively short terms actually
served by prisoners in the United States—the ‘‘total’’ values converge on
the actual sizes of prison populations; by 2002, for example, very few
pre-1990 prisoners are in the system.24
The fixed release rates counterfactual, then, compares two calculations of
Equation (1). The first ‘‘true’’ calculation uses the values of pt(s) in the actual
data. The second ‘‘counterfactual’’ calculation assumes that the release

23. By definition, data before the first available year are unreliable, so it is impossible to accurately estimate the release percentages pt(s) for those years.
24. In fact, for the states considered here, the net number of prisoners added by 2002
from the first year of data range from 88% (and often >95%) to a bit >100% of the total
BJS prison counts for 2002. (Values >100% clearly reflect counting differences between
the BJS and the NCRP or errors in the data.) This demonstrates again the relatively short
sentences served by a vast majority of prisoners.
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Table 2. Fixed Release Rates Counterfactual Example
Real Data
t ¼ 1988

t ¼ 1989

t ¼ 1988

t ¼ 1989

0.45
0.30

0.40
0.25

0.45
0.30

0.45
0.30

Notes: t denotes year of admission, pt(0) denotes the percent admitted in t who were released in less than a year, pt
(1) denotes the percent admitted in t who were released after serving more than one year but fewer than two.

patterns never changes after the first year. For example, assume that the data
start in 1988 and, in the real data, 45% of all prisoners admitted in 1988 are
released in 1988 and an additional 30% in 1989. However, for those admitted in 1989, sentencing is tougher, and only 40% released in 1989 and 25%
in 1990. Table 2 compares the real and counterfactual versions.
The fixed admissions counterfactual in turn allows the release rates [i.e., pt(s)]
to always take on their real-data values, but it fixes the size of each entering cohort
at the size obtained in the first year of available data. It does, however, allow the
distribution of offense types to change with each cohort. In other words, assume
that a stateÕs real data start in 1990. In that year, it admits 10,000 people to prison,
45%ofwhomareviolentoffendersand55%of whom are property offenders; in
1991, it admits 15,000 people, 48% of whom are violent offenders and 52%
of whom are property offenders. In the fixed admissions counterfactual, the
fictitious entering cohort in 1991 numbers only 10,000 (fixed at 1990s level),
but 48% of these are violent offenders and 52% property offenders (taking on
the actual 1991 distribution).25
Figures 3a and b compare the actual and counterfactual outcomes. Two
features immediately stand out. First, fixing release rates has almost no effect
on the net change in prison population. And second, fixing admission rates
leads many prison systems to steady if not shrinking populations.
Start with Figure 3a. If punishments have become more severe over the sample period, the solid ‘‘actual’’ curve (the real data) should rise above the dashed
‘‘fixed release rates’’ curve (the counterfactual data). And while that pattern
generally holds, the effects are slight. Actual prison populations are usually

25. The shares of offenders in each class are relatively stable, so little turns on the
changes in admissions composition, though the coarseness of the categories may mask
important intracategory changes.
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<10% or 11% (and often 1%) larger than the counterfactual
populations. Only Virginia witnesses a dramatic divergence, with the real population growing 24% faster, seemingly tied to VirginiaÕs sentencing guidelines
(which were adopted in 1992 and heavily amended in 1995). In a few states, the
real populations are smaller than the counterfactual ones. Illinois, for example,
added 21% fewer prisoners than had it kept its 1990 policies in place.
Figure 3b presents a fundamentally different picture. In almost all the
states under consideration, had admission rates remained constant, prison
population would have leveled off quickly. In fact, Figure 3b understates
the extent to which growth would have slowed, if not reversed, since it does
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Figure 3. Growth rates: (a) fixed release rates; (b) fixed admission size.
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not account for the release of prisoners admitted before the first year of data.
Thus, release rates in most states are such that prison populations would have
quickly reached equilibrium for a given level of admissions. To the extent
that prison populations have grown since 1990 or so, the pressure appears to
come from the admissions, not release, side of the ledger.
One potential objection to the results in Figure 3 is the different starting
times: Perhaps trends in release times or the distribution of entering inmates
differed between the late 1980s (when my data for states such as California
and Virginia start) and the mid-1990s (when my data for states such as
Colorado and New Jersey start). To check the robustness of Figure 3Õs
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results, I reran both counterfactuals starting every state in 1992, immediately
after the nationwide crime drop of the 1990s began, thus providing a common frame of reference. By and large, the results are nearly identical. The
only noticeable differences were that longer sentences played an even lesser
role in California, Illinois, Washington, and especially Minnesota26; and that

26. In other words, in these four states, the counterfactual fixed release rate prison
populations were larger than the real-data prison populations, implying that release policies had become more lenient over time. Such an effect is already visible for Illinois in
Figure 3a, albeit at a lesser level than that observed in the 1992-start counterfactuals.
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Figure 4. (a) Parolees as percent of admits. (b) Parolee movements: releases and
returns.
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growing admission cohorts played a lesser role in Michigan and Virginia,
where the real and fixed admissions counterfactual data are effectively indistinguishable.27 The results in Figure 3 thus appear to tell a robust story

27. In Virginia, the fixed admissions prison population was actually larger than the
real population, but just barely so. The fixed release counterfactuals (both in Figure 3a and
in the 1992-start version) for both Michigan and Virginia imply that little changed in either
state with respect to releases as well. Taken together, these results suggest that neither
admission nor release policy in either state has changed much since the early 1990s.
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about the source of prison growth since the late 1980s—both before and after
the post-1991 reversal in crime trends.

Although the counterfactuals indicate that admissions are driving growth,
the nature of the admissions shapes our interpretation of this result. If states
are violating parolees and probationers back more aggressively than in the
past, then the seemingly short times served seen above may be deceptive: If
a large number of prisoners return quickly to prison due to (perhaps technical) violations, then their effective sentence is much longer than the individual stints they serve, and so the seeming unimportance of releases may be
overstated. Figures 4a and b shed light on this issue.
Figure 4a plots the fraction of each admission cohort entering prison due
to either a voluntary or mandatory revocation of parole.28 It suggests that
while increases in parole violations may explain some of the decline in
apparent time served, they likely do not explain much. Outside of California,
relatively few admittees—rarely >30%—are returning parolees (in
California the rate neared 70% by 2002), though this fraction rose in several
states over the sample period, usually from 20% to 30%. In a handful of
states, especially Virginia and Washington, the fraction of parolees
plummeted; these declines, however, are not due to dramatic improvements
in reentry programs but rather to restrictions on, or the abolition of, parole
(so parolees simply no longer exist).29
Figure 4b poses an even more serious problem for the argument that
parole violations drive prison growth. With only a few exceptions, the
number of returning parolees is never larger than the number of parolees
leaving prison. Moreover, the trends in parolees returning roughly track
those in parole releases, and in many states the gap between releases and
returns remains constant, or even grows slightly. Figure 4b thus suggests

28. Each state relies almost exclusively on either voluntary revocations or mandatory ones, but never both. It is unclear whether this reflects differences in reporting or in
state policy choices.
29. Probation violations appear to play almost no role at all, never rising above 1%
(except for a small, and quickly vanishing, spike to 6% in South Dakota). In many cases,
no inmates in a given cohort are entering due to probation violations.
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5. The Determinants of Sentence Length
My results so far can be summarized as saying: ‘‘The typical prison sentence is short, and thus long prison sentences do not appear to drive recent
prison growth.’’ But it is worth asking ‘‘typical for whom?’’ The sections
above provide a highly aggregated view of penal outcomes, and these broad
patterns may mask important underlying variation in times served by different types of inmates: Black prisoners, for example, may serve systematically

30. For example, if 20% of all parolees are violated back to prison, then an increase
in parolees from 1,000 to 2,000 increases violations from 200 to 400, but the net effect of
parole is a 800-prisoner reduction in the prison population (from 1,000 – 200 ¼ 800 to
2,000 – 400 ¼ 1,600 prisoners on parole).
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that a parole-driving claim may invert the direction of causality. As the
prison population grows, the number of parolees grows with it, and a roughly
constant fraction of those paroled violate back to prison. It is not clear that it
is good accounting to then claim their return as causing prison growth.30 The
rising number of parolees may at some level be a symptom, not a cause, of
prison population growth.
Some caution, however, is needed when considering these results. First,
the NCRP only records the primary reason for admission. If an offender
violates his parole or probation and, in the process, is liable for a new
substantive crime and is admitted for that new crime, he does not show
up in the NCRP statistics as a parole readmission. If courts are more willing
to incarcerate violators for new offenses than otherwise similarly situated
nonparole offenders, then parole violations influence prison growth in
a manner invisible to the NCRP. Also, the constancy of parole violations
may be surprising during a period when the severity of the marginal offender
was declining, assuming lesser offenders violate parole less often. The
constant ratios in Figure 4b may thus understate the importance of changing
parole practices. Offsetting this effect, however, is the possibility that
parolees may be violated back—even on technical grounds—when the
triggering act is also a separate crime. Violations are easier than new charges
for police and prosecutors to process, so they may use violations as
procedural shortcuts for dealing with new offenses. In this case, the simple
number of returning parolees overstates the importance of violations.
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his ðtÞ ¼ h0 ðtjsÞexpðbtraiti þ CXi þ UZst Þ:

ð2Þ

Here, his ðtÞ is the hazard rate, the probability that offender i in state s is
released in year t, conditional on having stayed in prison until t in the first
place. h0 ðtjsÞ is the baseline hazard, which may be conditioned on the state in
question either through stratification or a shared frailty (random effects) parameter.32 Traiti is the particular individual-level characteristic under observation for inmate i, Xi the vector of all other individual-level traits (which are
fixed for each inmate), and Zst a vector of (generally) time-varying,
state-level controls.
I examine the effect of twelve dichotomous relationships on the relative
likelihood of release: whether the defendant is black (compared to either all
other inmates or all other non-Hispanic inmates); Hispanic; female; young
(under twenty-one years when entering prison), old (over forty years), or
middle-aged (between twenty-one and forty years); convicted for a violent
crime, a property crime, or a drug crime; and whether the defendant is

31. In an earlier version of this article, I also examined whether there were differences in the trends in the likelihood of release, but no effects appeared, with one exception—Hispanics appear to have faced declining likelihoods of release over the sample
period, though the effect size is small. I omit this discussion here.
32. Under stratification, h0 ðtjsÞ ¼ h0s ðtÞ; under shared frailty, h0 ðtjsÞ ¼ h0 ðtÞas ;
where as is a state-level random effect.
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longer sentences than otherwise-identical nonblack inmates. This section
briefly considers how important such masking may be by examining
how likelihoods of release vary based on inmatesÕ races, ethnicities, sexes,
ages, or offenses.31 I find that the already surprisingly short aggregate sentence lengths overstate time served by nonviolent offenders (or, conversely,
understate that served by the violent). They also overstate time served by
women and the elderly (those over the age of forty years), and understate
that served by Hispanics and the young (those under the age of twenty-one
years). The results are somewhat more complex for race, though they suggest
that whatever effect it may have is weak.
The basic model I use here is a Cox proportional hazard model, which in
its most general form is:
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33. Note that matching is not done in place of the Cox model but rather constitutes
a preliminary cleaning process. The matching protocol eliminates certain types of problematic outliers, and the matched data are then used conventionally in the Cox regressions.
34. I only provide the forest plots here, rather than tables of results for all forty-eight
regressions. The forest plots provide all the relevant information much more concisely,
and they make it substantially easier to see broad patterns within and across results. Complete results are available on request.
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a young black male (compared to either older, black male inmates or young,
nonblack males). To reduce the effect of outlier observations and to minimize the risk of model sensitivity, I use a nonparametric matching algorithm
to balance my data before applying the Cox model (see, e.g., Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller, 2007; Ho et al. 2007).33 The Appendix discusses in more
detail both the intuition behind matching and how I accomplish it; for our purposes here, it should just be noted that matching requires that I use dichotomous
treatment variables and that I examine each one in a separate regression.
I run four different versions of Equation (2) for each of the twelve sets of
traits (for a total of forty-eight regressions), varying the exact set of control
variables and assumptions about how to model state-level heterogeneity. In
all cases, standard errors are clustered at the state level. Table 3 lists the basic
elements of the four specifications, and Figure 5 provides the results. The
‘‘hazard’’ here is release from prison, so a ratio greater than one implies
a greater likelihood of release in a given period—prisoners, in other words,
want to experience the hazard. Since these are ratios, the critical question is
whether the results differ from one, not zero: A hazard ratio of 1 implies that
the two groups in question face the same hazard (i.e., that the particular trait
has no apparent effect).
These graphs provide both the point estimate and the upper and lower bounds
on the 95% confidence interval.34 The results are defined such that the hazard
ratio refers to the trait given in the title of the figure: In Figure 5.1, for example,
a value greater thanone implies thatblack prisoners are morelikelytobereleased
in any given period than otherwise identical nonblack prisoners. The numbers
under the results correspond to the model numbers in Table 3.
These results suggest that that the aggregate picture provided in the previous sections does mask intergroup variation in some settings. Hispanics,
for example, are 7% less likely to be released in any given period than
non-Hispanics. And (not surprisingly) violent offenders are 20% less
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Table 3. Basic Model Specifications
Model

State Controls

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No

Heterogeneity Controls
No
No
Stratify
Shared frailty

Notes: Individual controls are black, sex, age, offense, sentence, and credit for time served. Time-varying state
controls are per capita crime rates, percent young black male, percent below the poverty line, citizen and state
ideologies, government revenue shortfall, and per capita prison admissions. Time-invariant state controls are
whether the state had a TIS law or sentencing guidelines in the inmateÕs admission year. Stratify and shared
frailty are defined at footnote 32.

likely to be released than nonviolent offenders with similar sentences and
demographic traits35; phrased differently, nonviolent offenders serve even
shorter sentences than those suggested above, and violent offenders longer.
Conversely, women are 13% more likely to be released than similarly situated men, and older defendants 7% more likely.
The effect of race on time served requires a bit more attention. Black and nonblack inmates appear to face roughly the same likelihood of release (see Figure
5.1), implying that the aggregate results above apply equally to both types of
inmates. And this result appears to be relatively robust. First, the similarity between black and nonblack outcomes does not seem to be an ephemeral result of
blacks making up a disproportionate number of increasingly marginal
offenders.36 I condition on offense and sentence length, for example, and the
share of blacks in each entering cohort remains relatively constant (by about
65%). I am thus comparing similarly situated offenders, and the racial composition of the various ‘‘similarly situated’’ cohorts seems relatively stable.
Second, the equivalent likelihoods are not influenced by the lower release
likelihood of Hispanics. Hispanics comprise 30% of my observations, and
almost all Hispanics in my data self-identify as white. Thus, the overall similarity between whites and blacks could arise in part from non-Hispanic

35. The high hazard rates for property and drug offenders likely reflect the low hazard rate of violent offenders: If violent offenders are less likely be released in any period,
by definition nonviolent (i.e., property and drug) offenders are more likely.
36. Assume blacks admitted for Crime 1 serve three years, compared to two for
whites; and blacks admitted for Crime 2 served four years, compared to three for whites.
Average time served by whites and blacks may appear similar if blacks are increasingly
admitted for Type 1 crimes.
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whites being released earlier than blacks, and blacks earlier than Hispanic
whites. Figure 5.2, however, which eliminates all Hispanics from the sample, suggests that this is not the case.
Race may play a role, however, in shaping the longer sentences served by
young inmates. That young males—and young black males in particular—
tend to serve longer sentences is well documented (Steffensmeier, Ulmer,
and Kramer, 1998; Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Ulmer and Johnson,
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Figure 5. Relative hazard ratios. CI, confidence interval.
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6. Conclusion
The dramatic boom in American prison populations over the past thirty
years is a striking and oft-mentioned fact, but our understanding of its causes
remains surprisingly weak. This article seeks to shed light on the issue by

37. For space considerations, I omit the results here, but they are available upon
request.
38. How race plays a role remains unclear. Racial bias is of course a possibility, but
note that the NCRP does not provide data on prior records, so if young black men have
longer criminal histories that influence sentencing, this effect would be picked up by the
‘‘race’’ variable.
39. Again, I omit the results here, but they are available upon request.
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2004; Kurlychek and Johnson, 2004; Bushway and Piehl, 2007), and a similar effect appears in my data. To determine whether race or age drives it, I
look at two hazard ratios: that between young black males and young nonblack males (Figure 5.5), and that between young and old black males (Figure 5.6). As the two figures indicate, age seems to explain the ‘‘young black
male’’ penalty more than race.
Two possible limitations with the results in Figure 5 deserve attention.
First, California represents 40% of the data, so it may overly influences
the results. To examine this possibility, I rerun Models 1 and 2 without
California. No differences in results are statistically or numerically significant. California thus does not appear to be driving the result here.37
Second, there is a potential source of post-treatment bias lurking in these
models. One of the control variables is the imposed sentence. The models
thus ask if, for example, a black 25-year-old male arsonist sentenced to ten
years with no credit for time served spends as many days in prison as a white
25-year-old male arsonist sentenced to ten years with no credit for time
served. This is certainly a valid question. But perhaps we are concerned that
the real source of the problem is that a black 25-year-old male arsonist is
more likely to get a ten-year sentence than a similarly situated white defendant. Conditioning on sentence length masks this effect. Thus, I rerun Models 1, 2, and 4, as well as those dropping California, without the sentence
length term. The hazard for young black males compared to young nonblack
males falls somewhat (from 0.97 to 0.91), suggesting that race may influence the sentence imposed38; otherwise, the results are relatively stable.39
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Appendix
This appendix discusses the data and models in more detail. The first
part provides a closer look at the NCRP data and the steps taken to
clean it. It also explores the external consistency of the NCRP and our
ability to extrapolate from the states included in this study to the
United States as a whole. The second part fleshes out the data and
methods used in Section 5.
The NCRP
Basic Structure of the Data

The BJS began gathering data for the NCRP in 1983, with data available through 2002 when work on this article began. Participation in the
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probing the role of changes in time served. Increasingly severe sentencing
regimes are often cited as important forces in the growth of U.S. prison populations, but there has been little effort to examine this claim rigorously.
The results in this article indicate that the story is quite complex. In most
states in my sample, the median time served has been either relatively flat or
declining since the late 1980s or early 1990s. Some of this leveling or decline, however, appears to be due to states locking up increasingly marginal
offenders who would likely have received no term of incarceration in earlier
years: By serving short sentences, they pull down the median. When examining the effect in as much detail as the NCRP permits, it appears that it is
a key issue in California, a lesser issue in states like Illinois and Washington,
and not much of one in many of the other states in the sample.
Nonetheless, these results make clear that the primary engine driving prison
growth—at least over the past ten to fifteen years—has been changes in admissions, not time served. These two concepts are not entirely distinct since the
decision to incarcerate can be thought of at some level as a decision to not release immediately at Time 0. But it is nonetheless useful to separate out whether
prison growth is being driven by (1) locking up those who otherwise would
have gone to prison for much longer terms, (2) locking up those who otherwise
would not have gone to prison for long terms, (3) locking up those who otherwise would not have gone to prison for short terms, or some combination of
these three. The results from this article suggest that reason (3) is the key force.

520

American Law and Economics Review V13 N2 2011 (491–531)

40. Note that because the NCRP operates only at entry and exit, it provides no information on misbehavior by those admitted in a given year but not yet released. This
variable is thus quite hard to use since (unobserved) bad behavior may be responsible
for some inmates not yet being released.
41. Some entries theoretically available prove not to be. For example, the NCRP
includes a binary variable indicating whether the inmate has any prior felony convictions,
but it is blank for every observation in every state in every year of data. Other variables,
such as education, are not always left blank but are reported with enough infrequency to
make them hard to use. Despite these limitations, the NCRP remains the most comprehensive data set of its kind.
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program is voluntary, and the number of states contributing data has
fluctuated over the years, though nearly forty participate now (up
from thirteen in 1983). Participating states fill out an information
card for every inmate entering and leaving prison, and they provide
offender-level data not only on the exact date of entry into and exit
from prison but, among other things, on each inmateÕs race, sex,
age, educational background, conviction offenses, sentences imposed, nature of incarceration (new commitment, parole violation,
etc.), subsequent malfeasance while in prison (and its sentencing
implications),40 and type of release (completion of sentence, parole,
etc.). It is the most detailed centralized source of information on
prison inmates available.41
Unfortunately, the NCRP suffers from several noticeable shortcomings. Most immediately troubling, there are significant discrepancies between the NCRP and other sources of data. For many
states, the total number of admission or release observations in
the NCRP often does not match that given in the BJSÕs annual National Prisoner Survey. In some cases, the NCRP numbers differ by
as much as 75% or 100%. As a result, I use only those states that
have a sufficiently long string of consecutive years (at least eleven)
that do not deviate too much (generally by <10%) from the corresponding BJS data. Table A1 lists the states I use here and the years
that are included. In the end, I have 164 state-year pairs, containing
information on over three million inmates, and on over eight million
inmate-year observations.
The second significant shortcoming of the NCRP is that the admission
and release data sets are wholly separate, with no way to link an observation in an admissions file to that inmateÕs corresponding observation in
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Table A1. Years Available for Reporting States
State

End Year

1988
1992
1990
1984
1984
1989
1990
1992
1991
1985
1984

2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

a release file. This does not restrict my ability to calculate time served by
those released since the release file contains both admission and release
dates for each inmate. But to calculate either the time served quantiles or
the hazard ratio, I need to know both the time served by each released
prisoner and how many members of each entering cohort remain in
prison at the end of the sample period. The separate admission and release files, combined with numerous reporting errors, complicate this
latter calculation.
Ultimately, I must create ersatz observations for the right-censored
unreleased prisoners. To do this, I use the admissions files to determine
how many inmates of a certain type were admitted in a particular year, I
use all the subsequent release files to calculate how many of those prisoners were eventually released, and then I create dummy entries to make
up the difference. The ideal approach is the following: Assume that in
1990, California admits 100 twenty-five-year-old black male inmates
for second-degree assault with sentences of ten years and no credit
for prior time served. The release files for 1990 through 2002 indicate
that ninety-five inmates meeting these criteria—admitted in 1990,
twenty-five years old, black, and so on—have been released. I then create five dummy inmates with these traits, giving me the complete set: for
ninety-five inmates I know the exact day of entry and release, and for the
five dummy observations I create fake admission dates (uniformly distributed across the year, in keeping with the real admission data) and
know that they have not been released as of December 31, 2002. With
these dummy inmates, I effectively create an integrated admissions and
release file, allowing me to easily compute quantiles and hazards.
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California
Colorado
Illinois
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Jersey
South Dakota
Virginia
Washington

Start Year
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42. In some cases, I condition on a seventh, ethnicity. However, due to reporting
errors in the NCRP, I must drop Kentucky and Michigan from my sample when doing so
(a vast majority of observations in those two states are missing data on ethnicity), so I
condition on ethnicity only where necessary.
43. The evidence for this claim is indirect: There is no apparent ‘‘overrelease’’ problem
at the unconditional level. In other words, the total number of prisoners admitted in a particular
year is never less than the number released from that cohort over all future years, suggesting
that problem is misclassification, not the release of unrecorded admissions.
44. The sixteen are as follows: murder and other killing offenses (including assault
with intent to kill), kidnapping, sex offenses, robbery, assault (including hit-and-run and
child abuse), burglary, arson, theft and associated offenses (including trafficking, distributing, or receiving stolen goods), drug trafficking, drug possession, persistent felony violators,
unknown offenses, and four ‘‘other’’ categories (other violent, other property, other drugs,
and other [lesser] crimes that do not fit easily into the violent/property/drug taxonomy).
45. The six are under sixteen, sixteen to under eighteen, eighteen to under twenty-one,
twenty-one to under thirty-one, thirty-one to under forty-one, and forty-one and over.
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In theory, I could identify the exact admittees not yet released—
and thus not have to create ersatz alternatives—by conditioning on every
characteristic provided in the NCRP. Reporting errors in the NCRP,
however, render this approach impossible, and ultimately I condition
on only six variables: race, sex, age, most serious offense, sentence imposed, and credit for time served.42 Moreover, I have to adjust even these
categories to account for reporting flaws in the NCRP.
The key problem is that it often appears that >100% of inmates of
a particular type in a specific admission cohort are subsequently
released: A state may admit 100 inmates of a particular type in
1990 but appear to release 120 such prisoners from the 1990 cohort
over the next thirteen years. In numerous cases, prisoners who do
not exist in the admissions file appear in the releases file—for
example, no prisoner is admitted in California in 1988 for crime
code 13—yet several prisoners released in subsequent years from
the 1988 entry cohort are listed as having committed code 13
crimes. These errors appear to be coding errors: These are not
inmates who were never recorded as entering but are subsequently
being released, but rather they are inmates classified one way at the
time of admission and labeled differently at release.43 Not surprisingly, these errors grow the more disaggregated the data become, so
to minimize this problem I cluster many of the variables. I narrow
the NCRPÕs 186 offense codes down to sixteen broad categories,44
its continuous measure of age to six categories,45 its continuous
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46. The fifteen are less than a year; one year ranges from one to two years through
nine to ten years; ten to fifteen years, fifteen to twenty years; twenty to twenty-five years;
over twenty-five years but not life; and all life and death sentences. In general, at least 80%
of all sentences for all categories of crimes are below ten years, and 90% are below twenty.
47. The five categories are no credit, less than one year, one year to three years, three
years to five years, and more than five years.
48. For the models looking at the effect of being Hispanic, the total rises to 57,600
since Hispanic/non-Hispanic is now an option as well.
49. I am assuming here that the errors are on the release end, not the admission. I
have no evidence either way, and there appears to be no ex ante bias to choosing one
assumption about the location of the errors over the other.
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measure of sentence imposed to fifteen categories,46 and its continuous measure of credit for time served to five categories.47 I keep
the NCRPÕs binary classification of sex but reduce its 5-fold classification of race to a binary black/not-black measure. As a result, I
have potentially 28,800 (16  6  15  5  2  2) different
‘‘types’’ of offenders (and dummy offenders) per state per year.48
These coarser categories curtail the overcount problem, but they do
not eliminate it completely. A simple example demonstrates more concretely the problem that remains and how I correct it. Assume that in
1990, a particular state admits 900 inmates, and between 1990 and 2002
it releases 850 of them, so 50 from the 1990 cohort remain in prison at
the end of 2002. My methodology above would add fifty ersatz
offenders to the release files to create a full set of prisoners. Now assume
I condition on some trait, resulting in two groups of inmates, A and B.
According to the admissions file, the state admits 500 of Type A and 400
of Type B in 1990. According to the release files, however, between
1990 and 2002 the state releases 520 of Type A and 330 of Type B;
assume the unseen true values are 490 and 360, respectively.49 The total
remaining in prison is the same: The state has released 850
(520 þ 330) of the 900 (500 þ 400) admitted prisoners. But things
get tricky when I try to create my ersatz observations. My data claim
that I should create –20 dummies of Type A and 70 dummies of Type B.
In theory, I would like to correct this by turning thirty erroneous ersatz Bs
into ersatz As, but I do not actually know that the number is thirty. I know
that at least twenty inmates are misclassified (since I have twenty ‘‘impossible’’ releases for Type A), but I have no more information than
that. I cannot create ‘‘negative’’ dummies, and simply ignoring Type
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External Validity

My sample here consists of eleven states, which house 30% of the
nationÕs inmates. It is thus essential to understand how generalizable
the findings here are to nonreporting states. Since the NCRP is a voluntary program, there is no reason to assume that the reporting states
are merely a random sample of the entire nation, particularly since
some states have opted out after opting in.
Figure A1 plots quantile-quantile comparisons of key demographic, economic, and political traits of the included states against
those of the excluded states. As always, the more the points fall along

50. Consider an example when conditioning on just two traits, the conviction offense and sentence imposed. In California in 1990, 100 of 195 offense-sentence pairs yield
excess releases, ranging from 1 to 126, for a total of 1,702 ‘‘overages.’’ The remaining 95
pairs have remainders ranging from 0 to 774, for a total of 1,987 ersatz observations. I thus
randomly delete 1,702 of these 1,987 dummies, leaving me with 285 ersatz observations
across the 95 non-overage pairs. Looking at the unconditional data, by the end of 2002
only 285 inmates remain from the 1990 cohort, exactly the same as the number of ersatz
observations I created.
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As (i.e., creating zero dummies of this type) while creating seventy ersatz
Type Bs overstates the size of the prison population.
My solution, then, is the following. I constrain the number of ‘‘overage’’ inmates released to the number admitted: The number of Type As
released is restricted to 500. I then assume that all of the ‘‘excess’’ releases—the twenty extra Type A releases—should have been Type Bs, so I
reduce the number of ersatz Type Bs by twenty. I thus end up with zero
Type A dummies (since 500 out of 500 are assumed released) and fifty
Type B dummies (since 350—the 330 in the data and the 20 extra Type
As—of 400 are assumed released). These are, of course, not the true
values (in my example, I produce ten too few ersatz Type As and ten
too many ersatz Type Bs), but it is the best I can do with the data available, and it is likely a close enough approximation. In practice, of
course, I have more than two categories—in fact, I can have as many
as 28,800 or 57,600. I thus take a more aggregate approach. I total the
number of overages within a state/year and then randomly delete that
many dummies from all the non-overage categories.50 With this correction, I have a complete data set that approximates the real data.

The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity

525

the forty-five degree line, the more similar the two samples are. The
results are mixed. In general, the included states have lower property
crime rates, larger populations, more young men, lower unemployment and poverty rates, higher per capita incomes, and more conservative citizens and lower houses. Yet there are several categories
where the two sets of states are fairly similar, including violent crime,
percent young black (for most of the observations), and Democratic
governors. And for many categories where there are systematic
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Figure A1. Quantile-quantile plots.
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Empirical Models
Section 5 sets forth the basic Cox regression used here, but this section
covers three issues in more detail: the matching protocol, the sources
of the data, and the summary statistics.
The Basics of Matching

The intuition behind non-parametric matching is straightforward. The
goal is to convert observational data into something that looks more experimental, by ensuring that the ‘‘treated’’ and ‘‘control’’ groups look as
similar as possible. When ‘‘trait’’ in Equation (2) is black/not-black, for
example, the matching algorithm takes each black inmate (where black is
viewed as the treatment) and looks for a nonblack inmate (the control)
admitted in the same state and year with identical values for sex, age,
offense, sentence, and time credit. If no such nonblack inmate can be
found, the black inmate is dropped.51 As Ho et al. (2007) demonstrate,
using matched data in a parametric or semiparametric model (such as
the Cox model) leads to substantially more stable, less modeldependent results than when using unmatched data.52

51. For example, consider an inmate admitted in 1996 in California who is a black
male with an age score of 4, an offense code of 12, a sentence code of 11, and a credit score
of 0. In the model considering race, the matching protocol looks for a white male with
identical (4,12,11,0) traits. If none is found, the black observation is dropped. Thus,
a (black, X ) inmate is in the matched data only if the protocol can find a (white, X ) inmate
with identical X data. Once matched, the data are handled by the Cox model like any other
data—matching is not used in place of a parametric method. Because of the discrete nature
of my data, I keep only those observations with exact matches.
52. This matching approach is not equivalent to using a propensity score. As Ho
et al. (2007) make clear, the nonparametric nature of their matching technique confronts
directly the core limitations of propensity scores.
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differences, they do not appear to be large. Even incarceration rates,
which seem substantially lower in the included states, are actually
fairly similar but for one outlier.
Figure A1 thus indicates not only that some care should be taken
when extrapolating to the rest of the country but also that the included
states do not differ radically from other states. Cautious extrapolation
may thus not be out of place.
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Sources of Data
All offender-level data come from the NCRP between 1985 and 2002.
Population data are from the U.S. Census BureauÕs Population Estimates, available online at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/,
and poverty data are from the Census BureauÕs Historical Poverty
Tables, available online at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/
histpov/perindex.html. Crime data are from Uniform Crime Reports,
and prison admission data are from the BJS. Citizen and state ideologies

53. In other words, an offender admitted on August 1, 1988, and released on June 3,
1990, provides three offender-year observations (August 1, 1988, to December 31, 1988;
January 1, 1989, to December 31, 1989; and January 1, 1990, to June 3, 1990). This is
done to accommodate year-varying state controls.
54. Since some traits are easier to match on than others, the matched data sets for
various traits were often of different sizes. In some cases, the matched data included an
asymmetry: When matching on black, for example, there may have been fifty blacks
inmates of type X and fifty-five white inmates of type X in the matched data. In these
cases, I would randomly delete five of the white inmates so I had fifty pairs to draw from;
the randomly deleted white inmates were indistinguishable with respect to time served
from those retained.
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I must do more than simply match my data, however. The NCRP is an
extensive data set: The core data set for the eleven included states contains over three million offender observations and over eight million
offender-year observations.53 To make estimation computationally
feasible, I need to take a sample of my data. Ideally, I want take
a 1% sample of the data and thus have 30,000 offender observations
per regression. However, pure random sampling after matching undoes
the matching since random deletion may eliminate only one half of
a matched pair. But sampling before matching is not feasible since it
often results in data sets with substantially fewer than 30,000 observations: A match that may have been possible with the full data set
becomes impossible if one of the matching observations is deleted
before matching. To solve this problem, I perform the match on the full
data set, and I then sample by paired observations (either keeping both
pairs in a match or eliminating both), setting the sample weight such that
each sampled data set has 30,000 observations.54 The summary
statistics for the matched data sets are provided in Table A2.

Sex

Under 21

Over 40

29,626
63,827
0.5
0.091
4.649
26.657
4.139
2.256
0.016
13.522
52.538
51.411
0.049
0.003
0.337
0.602
0.887

30,130
59,021
0.431
0.5
4.755
28.824
3.628
2.020
0.016
13.363
51.876
51.379
0.048
0.003
0.341
0.650
0.880

29,810
80,804
0.445
0.030
0.5b
24.611
4.952
1.567
0.018
12.655
51.861
45.462
0.0481
0.002
0.313
0.554
0.797

30,486
62,581
0.407
0.094
0.5b
27.886
4.158
2.317
0.051
13.401
52.410
55.027
0.046
0.003
0.282
0.723
0.902

(0.500)
(0.288)
(0.848)
(12.672)
(2.976)
(1.298)
(0.006)
(2.785)
(6.561)
(22.325)
(0.012)
(0.001)
(0.693)
(0.489)
(0.316)

(0.495)
(0.500)
(0.767)
(11.851)
(2.700)
(1.267)
(0.007)
(2.814)
(7.537)
(23.274)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.742)
(0.477)
(0.325)

(0.497)
(0.170)
(0.500)
(12.473)
(3.468)
(1.102)
(0.007)
(2.778)
(7.929)
(21.553)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.655)
(0.497)
(0.402)

Between 21 and 40

Violent

Property

Drugs

30,268
68,170
0.416
0.069
0.5b
26.824
4.402
2.068
0.016

29,468
71,570
0.397 (0.489)
0.046 (0.210)
4.505 (0.861)
0.5b (0.500)
4.893 (3.223)
2.226 (1.230)
0.016 (0.006)

29,478
61,750
0.363 (0.481)
0.098 (0.297)
4.630 (0.840)
0.5b (0.500)
3.892 (2.765)
2.197 (1.298)
0.016 (0.006)

29,594
61,754
0.467
0.102
4.666
0.5b
3.790
2.154
0.016

(0.493)
(0.253)
(0.500)
(12.831)
(3.238)
(1.312)
(0.007)

(0.491)
(0.291)
(0.500)
(12.933)
(3.131)
(1.331)
(0.006)
(2.672)
(6.872)
(25.239)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.822)
(0.448)
(0.298)

(0.499)
(0.303)
(0.837)
(0.500)
(2.501)
(1.299)
(0.006)
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Original observations
Total observations
Black
Sex
Agea
Offensea
Sentencea
Credita
% Young black men

Black
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Original observations
Total observations
Black
Sex
Agea
Offensea
Sentencea
Credita
% Young black men
Poverty rate
Citizen ideology
Government ideology
Per capita crime rate
Prison admit rate
Per capita state revenue shortfall
TIS law
Guidelines

528

Table A2. Summary Statistics

(2.731)
(7.230)
(24.447)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.772)
(0.471)
(0.338)

13.474
52.348
52.121
0.049
0.003
0.314
0.617
0.876

(2.783)
(6.666)
(23.232)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.723)
(0.486)
(0.330)

Young Black Male
versus Non–
Young Black Male

29,992
84,903
0.5
N/A
N/A
N/A
23.403
4.911
1.555
0.018
12.773
52.323
45.322
0.049
0.002
0.311
0.547
0.816

29,984
84,274
N/A
N/A
N/A
3.740
26.024
5.349
1.651
0.021
12.100
52.503
40.964
0.048
0.022
0.301
0.543
0.771

(0.500)

(12.366)
(3.364)
(1.084)
(0.007)
(2.796)
(7.393)
(20.852)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.630)
(0.498)
(0.387)

(0.992)
(12.086)
(3.558)
(1.148)
(0.007)
(2.588)
(7.842)
(19.366)
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.614)
(0.498)
(0.420)

(2.753)
(6.987)
(22.710)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.699)
(0.490)
(0.335)

Hispanic
30,366
61,657
0.005
0.5
0.064
4.577
27.318
3.405
2.212
0.014
14.234
53.381
57.216
0.051
0.003
0.306
0.650
0.996

(0.073)
(0.500)
(0.245)
(0.808)
(13.436)
(2.113)
(1.304)
(0.004)
(2.562)
(3.682)
(22.340)
(0.012)
(0.001)
(0.755)
(0.477)
(0.064)

13.521
52.482
52.197
0.049
0.003
0.342
0.647
0.913

(2.792)
(6.734)
(22.965)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.726)
(0.478)
(0.281)

Black (Hispanic
omitted)
29,526
59,682
0.5
N/A
0.101
4.713
27.073
3.706
2.257
0.016
13.633
52.601
53.353
0.049
0.003
0.350
0.670
0.952

(0.500)
(0.301)
(0.833)
(14.465)
(2.575)
(1.287)
(0.007)
(2.823)
(5.093)
(21.831)
(0.011)
(0.001)
(0.724)
(0.470)
(0.214)

Note: values in parentheses are the standard errors.
a
Unless otherwise indicated, values reflect the categorical values described in footnotes 44–47 (i.e., the value of age can be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, depending on which range the offenderÕs age
falls within).
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Young Black Male
versus Other
Young Male

13.557
52.012
50.849
0.049
0.003
0.329
0.598
0.871
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Original observations
Total observations
Black
Hispanic
Sex
Agea
Offensea
Sentencea
Credita
% Young black men
Poverty rate
Citizen ideology
Government ideology
Per capita Crime rate
Prison admit rate
Per capita state revenue shortfall
TIS law
Guidelines

13.170
52.249
51.894
0.047
0.003
0.293
0.667
0.869
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Poverty rate
Citizen ideology
Government ideology
Per capita crime rate
Prison admit rate
Per capita state revenue shortfall
TIS law
Guidelines
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